EXHIBIT NO. 88

WAR PLANS INVISION (OP 12)

12-1. Duties:

(a) Police and Projects Section:
 (1) Development of policies and projects in support of war plans.

(2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of current plans for joint action of the Army and Navy, and in the polytion of current problems, (3) Osliaboration with other Government departments on policies and projects

affecting narional defense.

(4) Study of subjects referred to the War Plans Division by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(5) Action in advisory capacity in current administrative matters referred

to the War Plane Division.

(b) Plans Section;
(1) Direction of war planning.
(2) Preparation of designated war plans.
(3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory Plans. (4) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint Basic

(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on plans affecting na-

tional defense.

12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of the Joint Board (General Order No. 7).

12-3. The War Plans Division has memberahly on the following committees:

Joint Moard.

Joint Planning Committee.

Joint Aerenautical Board. Joint Air Advisory Committee.

Shore Station Development Board.

12-4. The War Plane Division is nonadministrative.

EXHIBIT NO. 89

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK IN HAWAII

1. The broad responsibilities of the Army and Navy in Hawaii were contained in Army and Navy war plans prepared and issued to the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii. These responsibilities were expressed in the various plans in terms of joint missions and separate Army and Navy missions. With the exception as indicated below, these missions are stated identically in all war plans current in 1941 as follows:

JOINT MISSION

To hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

NAVY MISSION

To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

ARMY MISSION

To hold Oahu against attack by land, sea and air forces and against

hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

2. In the most recent plan the phrase in the Army Mission "to support the Naval Forces" was deleted and the following was substituted; "Support Naval Forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases."

[2] 3. It should be noted that in all cases the missions called for

mutual support.

4. Based on these broad missions the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Navy Commander in Hawaii agreed to accept certain responsibilities for defense against air attack. These agreements are to be found in the various local joint plans and the separate plans of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. The basic current plans in Hawaii on Dec. 7, 1941 were: The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941, and the Army and Navy Operations Orders and agreements based thereon. These plans and agreements contain the following major provisions pertaining to defense against air attack:

(a) Antiaircraft Defensé

Responsibility	Provisions	Source
ARMY	 "Shall provide for: a. The * * * antiaircraft defense of OAHU" Army Antiaircraft, "supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aircraft." 	Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941 Par 2, FO No. 1 NS (Naval Security) Hq. Hawaiian Dept.
	(3) The Army, "Arrange for such coordination of the antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in PEARL HARBOR and the Army antiaircraft defense as	Par. 3b (3), FO No. 1 NS (Naval Security)
NAVY	may be practicable." "The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District * * are taking certain security measures, which include:	Par. 1b FO No 1 NS (Navy Security) Hq. Hawaiian Dept.
	(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor."	
	"In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore- based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense."	Par. 3g. (2) (6) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41.
	[4]	
	"The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District " " shall: (a) exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack. (b) Arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced."	
	(d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base defense."	

Conclusion: The orders and agreements on the part of the local Army and Navy Commanders lead to the conclusion that primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense rested with the Army but that the Navy had a secondary responsibility in conection therewith.

(b) Aircraft Warning Service

Responsibility	Provisions	Source
Army	(1) The Army "shall provide for: * * * b. "An antiaircraft * * * intelligence and warning service."	Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941.
Navy.	"During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR, and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."	Par. 11, Annex VII Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

Conclusion: The Army had primary responsibility for the establishment of an aircraft warning service. The Navy, however, agreed to furnish such means as it had, pending the installation of the Army facilities then under construction.

(c) Aircraft

(RECONNAISSANCE PHASE)

D 11 3/4	Y	Q
Responsibility	Provisions	Source
Army	(1) "Shall provide for:	
	Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu DCA in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol."	Par. 17, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan HCF.
Navy	(1) Navy "shall provide for: a. An inshore patrol. b. An offshore patrol * * * i. Distant reconnaissance."	Par. 18, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. HCF.
	(2) "When naval forces are insufficient for long distant patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations."	Par. 2c, Annex VII, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. HCF.
[6]	(DEFENSIVE AIR)	
Army	"b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the	Par. 2b. Annex VII Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Navy	tactical command of the Army." (1) "Each commander will * * make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the cir-	Plan Par 2 Annex VII
	cumstances warrant." (2) "With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable."	Par 2b. Annex VII
	(OFFENSIVE AIR)	
Army	"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea within range of Army	Par 17g. Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan
Navy	bombers." (1) "Shall provide for * * * j. Attacking enemy Naval Forces." (2) "Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy."	Par 18, Joint Coastal Frontier Def. Plan. Par 2a Annex VII

1940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[7] Conclusion: The Navy was primarily responsible for close and distant aerial reconnaissance and offensive air operations against hostile surface craft. The army was primarily responsible for defensive air operations. Regardless of the service primarily responsible, the opposite service was charged with supporting the operation within the means available to it.

To summarize, it will be seen from the above analysis that:

(a) Definite plans and agreements existed in Hawaii for defense against aircraft;

(b) Although the Army had the primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense, aircraft warning service and defensive air operations and the Navy had the primary responsibility for close and distant reconnaissance, and offensive air operations, each service was charged with augmenting the forces of the other with the means available to them in order to provide the maximum effective defense.